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THE DANGER OF BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM
IN COPYRIGHT
Alfred C. Yen*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am reticent about identifying the "worst" intellectual property
case ever. Although there is value in discussing superlatives (even
negative ones), I have a general sense that preoccupation with rank
ordered lists has become counterproductive.' I will, however, use
the space so kindly afforded me by this law journal to discuss West
Publishing Company v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,2 a case that
exhibits an unfortunate form of legal reasoning that I call "boot-
strap formalism."3
Intuitively, "bootstrap formalism" is the expansive reading of a
legal claim without adequate doctrinal or policy support. Bootstrap
formalism is formalism because it uses the logical implications of
legal rules to reach a given result.4 I have added the term
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Copyright 1998 by Alfred C. Yen.
Consider two examples that legal academics know only too well-the U.S. News and
World Report annual ranking of law schools and the Chicago-Kent Annual Survey of
Scholarship. Both rankings offer interesting and valuable information. However, it is only
too easy for people who should know better to become overly concerned with how they or
their institutions fare by these idiosyncratic measures of quality.
2 799 F.2d 1219, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter West v. Mead]. I
am not the first writer to write critically about this case. For other analyses, see L. Ray
Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law
Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1989); James H. Wyman,
Comment, Freeing the Law: Case Reporter Copyright and the Universal Citation System, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 217 (1996).
' Bootstrap formalism may well be troubling if used in other areas of the law as well.
However, I will restrict my claim made here to copyright law since West v. Mead is a
copyright case.
' For discussions of formalism, see Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The
Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 329, 329-30
(1994) (describing Langdellian formalism as based on logical deduction, resting on distinctly
legal premises, and finding that proper application of legal reasoning insures a uniquely
correct result for every legal case); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and
the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 180-81, 184-
185 (1987) (defining formalism as "the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case
from premises accepted as authoritative" and describing positive economic analysis of law
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"bootstrap" because bootstrap formalism stretches legal rules to the
point that they offer little support for the result reached. Thus, an
opinion exhibits "bootstrap formalism" when 1) it recognizes a legal
claim by relying on a plausible, but logically questionable, applica-
tion of doctrine and 2) the opinion has little, if any, discussion of
the relevant policy issues that might otherwise support its strained
application of doctrine.
Bootstrap formalism is particularly undesirable in copyright
because it paves the way for making copyright rights broader than
they should be. Copyright rights are clearly limited in their scope
by statute,5 and these limits exist because unlimited copyright
rights would not optimally advance the progress of science and art,
nor would they be consistent with a proper balance between the
natural rights of authors and those who read and use copyrighted
works.6 Ideally, copyright doctrine would contain rules that clearly
define the limits required by copyright theory. If that were the
case, formalism would be an excellent method for avoiding the
overextension of copyright law. Following the rules would be
tantamount to following copyright's theoretical limits. However,
copyright doctrine is notoriously vague. It is possible to interpret
copyright very broadly, but it is not at all certain that such broad
interpretations properly limit copyright's scope.7  Formalism
as the modern exemplar of formalism in common law); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (generally supporting the idea that legal reasoning as applied to rules
controls the outcome of cases).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (defining the scope of copyright rights) and § 106 (specifying
the rights granted to a copyright holder).
6 The primary theoretical basis for American copyright law is the belief that copyright
provides a necessary incentive for the production of desired works. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass copyright legislation "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991) (implicitly recognizing the importance of limiting the scope
of copyright in order to promote the public interest). A secondary theoretical basis is the
belief that copyright is a property right that the creator of a work deserves as a matter of
natural law. For explanations of how these theories require limits on the scope of copyright
law, see Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright Law:
The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343
(1989).
' For example, it is possible to interpret copyright law so that almost any kind of
borrowing constitutes copyright infringement. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and
Feelt ", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989).
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therefore provides a poor method for avoiding the overextension of
copyright because the formal plausibility of a particular interpreta-
tion of copyright provides little comfort about the propriety of the
result reached. Bootstrap formalism therefore creates the danger
of carelessly expanding copyright law to the detriment of the public
interest.
II. WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY V. MEAD DATA CENTRAL
The case of West Publishing Company v. Mead Data Central8
provides an excellent example of bootstrap formalism and its
dangers. The facts of the case are quite familiar.
For years, the plaintiff West compiled and published the written
opinions of state and federal courts in its "National Reporter
System."9 Each of West's volumes contained the text of the
opinions, headnotes, synopses and citations.'" West also checked
the accuracy of citations in the opinions and assigned opinions to
particular volumes in its system, depending primarily on a court's
identity (e.g., state v. federal) and geographic location." West
claimed copyright in each volume of the series. 2
The defendant Mead Data Central owned and operated the
LEXIS on-line legal research service. 3 LEXIS competed directly
against West in the publication of case reports."' In June of 1985,
Mead announced plans to add "star pagination" to the LEXIS
service by inserting page numbers from West's National Reporter
System into LEXIS case reports. 5 This would tell LEXIS users
the precise West page number on which the text of reported
opinions appeared." Without star pagination, LEXIS users who
desired pinpoint cites had to look the relevant opinion up in an
actual West reporter. The addition of star pagination obviated the
need for such action.'
7
6 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986).
9 Id. at 1221.
10 Id. at 1221-22.
11 Id.
2 Id. at 1222.
13 Id.
14 Id.
16 Id.
16 Id.
" Id. at 1222, 1228.
1998] 455
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West recognized that star pagination might reduce demand for
its case reporters and brought suit, 8 claiming that Mead's
addition of star pagination infringed West's copyright in its case
reporters.' 9 West moved for a preliminary injunction, which was
granted by the District Court.20 Mead then appealed to the
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed in an opinion that rested almost
entirely on a formalistic application of copyright doctrine with no
significant discussion of copyright policy.2'
III. WEST V. MEAD AS BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM
A. A FEW COPYRIGHT BASICS
The identification of West v. Mead's bootstrap formalism starts
with a brief review of the basic doctrine governing the scope of
copyrightable subject matter and the specific rights protected by
the copyright law.
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act grants copyright protection
only to "original works of authorship."22 Courts have interpreted
this phrase to mean works whose creation involves a modest level
of creativity in their selection and arrangement of otherwise
uncopyrightable things.23 Thus, a book is copyrightable because
its text is the creative selection and arrangement of otherwise
uncopyrightable individual words. Anthologies of works and
compilations of facts are also copyrightable, as long as their
selection and arrangement involves that same minimal level of
creativity.24 However, the facts contained in a compilation may
18 Id. at 1228.
' Id. at 1222.
20 Id.
21 Id.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Feist v. Rural Telephone Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) ("the creation of a nonfiction work, even a
compilation or pure fact, entails originality"); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 n.3, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1193-94 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing copyright in anthologies);
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 762 (2d Cir. 1984)
(discussing the originality requirement). For more in depth analysis, see Alfred C. Yen, The
Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics
of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991).
456 [Vol. 5:453
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/5
BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM
not be copyrighted because, according to the Supreme Court, people
do not creatively author facts.2"
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act further limits the scope of
copyright protection by specifically excluding from protection
certain items, regardless of whether they might be "original works
of authorship." This list includes ideas, methods of operation, and
discoveries. 2' The Act excludes these items because the free
dissemination of ideas and processes assures a good supply of raw
material for discussion and future creative efforts.
Finally, Section 106 of the Copyright Act sets out the specific
rights owned by copyright holders. Contrary to popular belief, not
every use or reference to a copyrighted work results in infringe-
ment. Instead, copyright owners control only the rights to repro-
duction, the creation of derivative works, public display, public
performance, and distribution."
B. WEST V. MEAD'S USE OF COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
The doctrines laid out above make the weakness of the claim
against Mead quite apparent. Although West clearly has copyright-
able material in its reporters (i.e. the headnotes and synopses of
the cases), the items borrowed by Mead are of doubtful copyrightab-
ility. The LEXIS offerings at issue were the full text opinions of
judicial decisions. West could not possibly claim copyright in those
opinions because West did not author them. As for the provision
of star pagination, it would seem that Mead had simply reported an
uncopyrightable fact (i.e. pinpoint cites) to its subscribers. Even if
one argued that Mead had borrowed the sequencing of West's
pagination, it is hard to see how starting with page number one
and continuing in sequence amounts to copyrightable author-
ship. 9
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. See also Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981).
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
2 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50; Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F.2d 485, 488, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1140, 1142 (2d Cir. 1984).
26 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
" See Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (denying copyright to the alphabetical ordering of names
in a phone book).
19981 457
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The Eighth Circuit's response to these problems amounts to a
clever, but strained, application of copyright doctrine. The court
denied that West's claim depended on copyright in facts or the
Arabic numbering system. 0 Instead, the court stated that West's
selection and arrangement of cases was sufficiently creative to
support copyright and based its analysis on whether star pagina-
tion somehow infringed copyright in that arrangement.31
In concluding that star pagination did infringe West's selection
and arrangement of cases, the court noted that a LEXIS user could
use star pagination to reproduce an entire West volume. The user
would do this by viewing the first case in a West reporter through
LEXIS. Star pagination would then reveal the final page number
of the first case, and by implication the page on which the next case
would start. The process would then be repeated over and over
until the user had reconstructed the identity and sequencing of all
the cases in a given West reporter.3 2 The court went on to state
that even if this reconstruction were not possible, infringement
would still occur because star pagination would "enable LEXIS
users to discern the precise location in West's arrangement of the
portion of the opinion being viewed."3
Even if one accepts the court's assertion that West's selection and
arrangement of cases is copyrightable, 4 the logical weakness of
the court's reasoning is easy to see. The court appears to be stating
that star pagination infringes the copyright holder's right to make
copies of a copyrighted work.35 However, Mead never makes the
purportedly infringing copy because, as the court notes, the copy
would be made only if a LEXIS user took specific purposeful steps
30 West, 799 F.2d at 1227.
1 Id.
32 Id. at 1227-28.
33 Id. at 1227.
" One could easily dispute whether West's selection and arrangement of cases is
sufficiently original to support copyright. After all, West's selection includes all published
opinions, and that is hardly original. As for West's arrangement, division by state,
geography and jurisdiction does not seem terribly creative or original either. See Feist, 499
U.S. at 362 (denying copyright because plaintiffs selection and arrangement was ordinary
and "garden variety").
"The court never identifies the reproduction right specifically, but its claim that a
LEXIS user could recreate the selection and arrangement of a West volume follows the
contours of a claim about reproduction rights.
458 [Vol. 5:453
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to accomplish the task."6 If Mead itself never commits the act of
infringement, it is hard to see how provision of star pagination to
LEXIS users amounts to the same thing. Indeed, the true infringer
would appear to be the LEXIS user who used LEXIS to reproduce
a West volume."
The court's claim that the mere provision of jump cites consti-
tutes infringement is equally weak. As noted earlier, the provision
of jump cites appears to be the straightforward communication of
facts, and facts are clearly not copyrightable subject matter.38 The
court's response appears to be that the provision of a single jump
cite would be permissible, but that Mead's provision of all jump
cites constitutes the appropriation of West's entire arrangement of
cases.39 There are two possible ways to interpret this argument.
First, the argument could mean that Mead's provision of all jump
cites allows the reproduction of West's selection and arrangement
of cases. If this is the correct interpretation, all of the objections
previously laid out apply.
Second, the argument could mean that Mead has infringed West's
copyright in a compilation of the numbers assigned to each page of
text. This assertion has a number of serious problems. As an
initial matter, it is not at all clear that West ever created such a
- West, 799 F.2d at 1227.28.
'7 Perhaps West could have argued (and it did not do so) that the provision of star
pagination made Mead liable for the user's infringement on either a vicarious liability or
contributory infringement theory. However, this claim would also have had serious
problems. First, either theory requires that some user actually make the infringing copy,
and there was no evidence that any user had ever done so. Second, defendants will not be
held liable for contributory infringement unless they know that an infringement is likely to
occur, and the cost of reproducing a West volume in the manner suggested makes it highly
unlikely that such reporductions will occur. See West, 799 F.2d at 1227 (noting that the
expense would make reproduction unlikely); Religious Tech Ctr, v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp.
1361, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (1995) (discussing contributory liability). Third, vicarious
liability is imposed only if the vicariously liable defendant has control over the behavior of
the infringing actor, and Mead did not have such control over its users. See Shapiro v.
Green, 316 F.2d 304, 307, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275 (1963) (discussing vicarious liability),
Religious Tech Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (discussing same). Fourth, the fact that LEXIS and
star pagination were susceptible to numerous noninfringing uses makes contributory liability
highly unlikely. See See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (1984) (declining to find vicarious or contributory infringement where
the consumer might use the product to make unauthorized copies).
' See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
39 West, 799 F.2d 1228-29.
1998] 459
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compilation. Although West assigned a number to each page of
text, it never collected those assignments and presented them in a
coherent fashion. There is no work entitled "Page Number
Assignments of the West Reporter System." Additionally, even if
the necessary compilation exists, it does not embody the modicum
of creativity required to support copyright. After all, West simply
takes the first page of each volume and starts with the number one,
followed by the second page with the number two, and so on. This
is precisely the same sort of ordinary arrangement that failed to
support copyright in Feist.4 ° Finally, even if the compilation
somehow supported copyright, Mead did not borrow the copyright-
able aspects of the compilation. Copyright subsists in the creative
selection and arrangement of a factual compilation.4' West's
decision to report all the page numbers of its case reporters is not
creative (indeed, it represents no selection at all), so Mead's copying
of those same page numbers cannot lead to infringement. Thus,
the arrangement of West's page numbers is the only possible basis
for infringement, but LEXIS does not present cases (and therefore
pages) to Lexis customers in the same order as West's case
reporters do. Mead is therefore unlikely to have borrowed anything
copyrightable from West.
C. THE WEAKNESS OF WEST V. MEAD AND THE PROBLEMS OF
BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM
The foregoing analysis shows that West v. Mead stands on a
logically strained application of the copyright doctrine. The court's
opinion claims that the rules and principles of copyright doctrine
compel the result reached when there are very strong arguments
to the contrary. When one considers the fact that courts grant
preliminary injunctions only when there is "at least a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits,"2 the court's decision seems
even weaker. At the very least, this case was not one that
reasonably favored the plaintiff.
40 Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (finding factual compilation of white pages uncopyrightable in part
because the alphabetical ordering of the names was not original).
4 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
'
2 See Atari Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,613, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (setting forth standard for
granting preliminary injunctions).
460 [Vol. 5:453
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The dubious nature of the Eighth Circuit's formal reasoning
raises questions about whether the court decided West v. Mead
correctly. To be sure, formal reasoning alone can provide strong
justification for a judicial decision, so the objection here is not with
the court's reliance on formalism per se. However, when a court
applies rules in a way that "pushes the envelope" of acceptable
interpretations, as the Eighth Circuit did in West v. Mead, formal-
ism provides a weak justification because the eyebrow raising
nature of the court's reasoning signals an error in outcome, and not
a correct decision. Stretched interpretations of doctrine may be
correct, but it is difficult to justify them on the basis of formal
reasoning alone. Something else, perhaps an appeal to the policy
behind a set of legal rules, is necessary.
The West v. Mead opinion nicely illustrates how bootstrap
formalism can harm the public interest. The court clearly under-
stood that its decision would protect West's position as the
dominant supplier of case reports. Star pagination would obviate
the need for some consumers to purchase printed West reports.
Preventing star pagination would therefore preserve West's market
position or allow West to collect a license fee from Mead Data in
return for those sales.43
However, the mere possibility that West would lose sales of its
case reporters is not, in and of itself, a reason to stretch copyright
doctrine so that West's competitors become copyright infringers. As
many have described, it is copyright's offer of a limited monopoly
in an author's creative work that encourages an author to produce.
This implies that copyright is sensibly interpreted to create and
protect only competitive advantages in the exploitation of works
created by authors. It makes no sense to protect competitive
advantages in things not created by authors because those
competitive advantages provide little, if any, incentive to produce
new authorship. This explains why the copyright statute protects
only "original works of authorship.""
Consider now the sources of West's market advantage in the sale
of case reporters. The typical West reporter contains summaries of
the cases, headnotes, and references to West's key numbering
'3 West, 799 F.2d at 1228.
"17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
19981
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system. Consumers sometimes purchase West reporters to enjoy
the benefits of these items. However, these items are not the only
reasons that a consumer might buy West case reporters. At least
nine states, five federal circuit courts, and ten federal district
courts require citation to the West National Reporter System.45
Moreover, citation rules promulgated in The Bluebook: A Uniform
System of Citation (the "bluebook") generally require primary or
parallel citation to the West National Reporter System.4' Lawyers
therefore face the practical requirement of buying West reporters
in order to cite cases properly.
Brief reflection shows that copyright sensibly protects only the
first of these competitive advantages. West clearly created its
summaries, headnotes and key numbering system. Copyright
ought to protect the economic advantages that flow to West from
the sale of these items because it is precisely those advantages that
encourage West to create and disseminate creative authorship. If
West were to stop putting its summaries, headnotes and key
numbering references in its case reporters, the competitive
advantage discussed would largely disappear. Consumers would
have little reason to prefer a West reporter over another reporter.
The texts of the reported opinions would be the same.
The states requiring citation to West's National Reporter System are Delaware,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississipppi, Oklahoma and Tennesse. DEL. SuP. CT. RULES 14(g);
IOWA RULES APP. PRoC. 14; KY ST RCP 76.12(4Xg); MiSSISSiPPI SUP. CT. 28;, OK CT. R AND
P II Rule 3.5(C); TENN CT. RULES, R. OF APP. P. 27(h); NY CPLR Rule 5529(e); WA R RAP
10.4(g). The Federal Circuit Courts requiring such citation are the D.C., First, Third,
Eleventh and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. See GEN. RULES OF THE U.S. CT. OF APP.
FOR THE DIST. OF COL. CIR. 11(b); RULES OF THE U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR THE FIRST. CIR. Rule
Loc.R.28. 1; RULES OF THE U.S. COURT OF APP. FOR THE THIRD. CIR. 21(1XA)(i); RULES OF THE
U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR THE ELEVENTH CIR. 28-2(j); RULES OF THE U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR THE
FED. CIR. 28(e). The Federal District Courts requiring such citation are the Central District
of California, Eastern District of California, District of Delaware, District of Nevada, Western
District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of Oklahoma, Northern District of Oklahoma, Eastern
District of Tennessee, Middle District of Tennessee, and Eastern District of Washington. See
LOCAL RULES FOR THE CENT. D. OF CAL. 3.9.3; LOCAL RULES FOR THE EASTERN DIST. OF CAL.
134(d); LOCAL RULE FOR THE DIST. OF DEL. 3.2C(6); LOCAL RULES FOR THE DIST. OF NEV.
130.4(b); LOCAL RULES FOR THE WEST. DIST. OF OK 13(E); LOCAL RULES FOR THE EAST. DIST.
OF OK. 13(e); LOCAL RULES FOR THE NORTH. DIST OF OK 14.E; LOCAL RULES FOR THE EAST.
DIST. OF TENN. 3.7.4; LOCAL RULES FOR THE MIDDLE. DIST. OF TENN. 8(cX3); LOCAL RULES
FOR THE EAST. DIST. OF WA. 7(g)(1). See also Wyman, supra n. 2, at 229-230 (explaining how
litigants are required to cite to West's National Reporter System.).
"' See The Bluebook Uniform System of Citation, table T.1 (16th Ed. 1996).
462 [Vol. 5:453
10
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/5
BOOTSTRAP FORMALISM
By contrast, West did not create the rules and conventions that
require litigants to cite West reporters. Therefore, it makes no
sense for copyright to protect economic advantages that flow to
West from these requirements. Regardless of whether West's
reporters contain summaries, headnotes or key numbering
references, consumers still have to buy West case reporters because
there is no other way to obtain the cites they have to use. Main-
taining this economic advantage through copyright therefore
enriches the West Publishing Company without providing any
incentive for the creation and dissemination of authorship.
Consumers are locked in, no matter what West does.
The foregoing analysis provides the necessary framework to
determine whether West v. Mead's bootstrap formalism served the
public interest. If the decision prevented others from selling or
distributing West's case summaries, headnotes and key numbering
references, then the decision served the public interest. If, on the
other hand, the decision converted requirements about the form
and method of citation into a West monopoly over the sale of case
reporters and the provision of legal cites, then the decision did not
serve the public interest. Of course, it is abundantly clear that
West sued Mead because it did not want LEXIS users to obtain
official cites without buying West reporters. Mead never offered
any of West's summaries, headnotes or key number references on
LEXIS, so there is no way that the Eighth Circuit's decision
preserved West's monopolies over those items. Thus, the only thing
accomplished by the West v. Mead decision was the preservation of
the competitive advantage West enjoyed simply because it pub-
lished case reports from which courts direct litigants to cite. West
v. Mead's bootstrap formalism therefore harmed the public inter-
est.47
"7 Some may argue that West might have stopped providing case reports without
protection from LEXIS' competition, and that the Eighth circuit correctly decided the case.
There are many reasons to doubt this conclusion. First, the print market for case reporters
remained unchanged and vital. Even though on-line research has taken away some demand
for printed case reports, many lawyers and libraries still maintain printed case report
collections. Second, West itself can compete for its own share of the on-line case report
market, and it has by providing the Westlaw service. Moreover, West can use the
competitive advantage it owns in its summaries, headnotes and key numbering system
against others in this market. Third, it is doubtful whether copyright incentives are
necessary at all to ensure the provision of case reports. Courts have always been reluctant
1998] 463
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IV. CONCLUSION - LEARNING FROM THE PROBLEMS OF WEST
The mistake in the West v. Mead opinion is clear. The opinion
uses bootstrap formalism to justify a copyright claim with practical-
ly no analysis of the copyright policy or public interest issues at
stake. By doing so, the opinion uses copyright law to protect
economic advantages that bear little relation to the objectives of
copyright law, thereby harming the public interest.
The court's mistake is particularly interesting and important to
note because, although the Eighth Circuit probably did not realize
it at the time, West v. Mead offers an early glimpse of the analyti-
cal problems courts will face in the coming electronic information
age. West enjoyed overwhelming dominance in the market for case
reports, but new technology offered competitors an opportunity to
challenge West. The on-line provision of case reports allowed
LEXIS customers to have access to huge numbers of cases without
having to devote significant physical space to libraries. Also,
computerized research tools made on-line research more convenient
than searching for cases in printed reporters. West understandably
perceived the threat to its economic position and sued to protect
itself.
Without question, the story written by West and Mead will be
retold many times in the years to come. The coming information
age relies heavily on the use, reuse and recycling of information,
some of it copyrighted material. Moreover, the centerpiece of this
age, the Internet, operates by literally making and distributing
copies of copyrighted material."8 All of this use, reuse, recycling
to grant monopolies in case reporting. See West, 799 F.2d at 1224-26; see also Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (8 Pet.) 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834) ("no reporter has or can have any
copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot
confer on any reporter any such right"); Robert Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby:
Planning the Future of Legal Information, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 618 (1995). See also
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES' GOVERNMENT RELATIONS POLICY (1992)
(regarding the dissemination of government information). Nevertheless, case reports have
always been available.
" Andy Johnson Laird, The Anatomy of the Internet Meets the Body of the Law, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 465, 469 (1997); Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies": A Hit or Myth?
Historical Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 DAYTON
L. REv. 423, 452 (1997); Kenneth D. Suzan, Comment, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital
Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB.
L. REv. 789, 796 (1995).
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and copying makes it easy for those who own intellectual property
to make claims against those exploiting new information technolo-
gy. Without question, some of those claims will be justified. At the
same time, however, it is important to realize that "novel" claims
that stretch the envelope of copyright (like West's claim against
Mead) should not be blithely accepted as clever adaptations of old
principles to new facts. Indeed, it is precisely those claims that
present the possibility of bootstrap formalism that harms the public
interest. In those situations, courts need to scrutinize the claims
being advanced to see if they are justified. If they fail to do so, the
mistake of West will be multiplied, and consumers as well as
producers will pay higher prices in a slower and poorer information
age.
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